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This article seeks to open up debate about Parliamentary debate by exploring the history 
of ideas about Parliamentary debate and rhetoric through the lens of four core concepts: 
deliberation, oratory, opposition and spectacle. These are not the names of singular ideas 
let alone schools of thought; they are conceptual fields each of which gives a particular 
shape to ways of conceiving, criticizing and defending Commons debate. In mapping this 
topos – identifying historical debates and practices alongside contemporary arguments 
found in political theory, political science and Rhetoric – I show that our thinking and 
arguing about the Commons is part of a contested and ongoing history more complex 
than we acknowledge. I argue that Parliamentary Debate has a number of purposes and 
that our thinking about it, and evaluation of it, should not be contained within the frame 
of ‘deliberation’ but should also take account of the political value and importance of 
oratory, opposition and spectacle. 
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Introduction 
 
At the heart of British democracy is a place for speaking, discussion and parley: 
Parliament. But love for Parliamentary talk seems scarce. The 2014 Hansard Society 
report on political engagement found that while two thirds of people thought Parliament 
‘essential for our democracy’, only 51% agreed that it ‘debates and takes decisions about 
                                                 
1 This article is based on work presented in various locations over a wide span of time including the 
Political Thought Conference organized by the Association for Political Thought at Oxford in 2013, a 
workshop organized by colleagues at the University of University of Jyväskylä in February 2016 and the 
conference ‘Speaking in Parliament: History, Politics, Rhetoric’ at Queen Mary, University of London in 
April 2016. I grateful for the invitations which enabled me to test out the work and to the responses of 
audiences which helped me improve it. Helpful commentary was also received from Samuel A. Chambers 
and Sophia Hatzisavvidou. 
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issues that matter to me’ (Hansard Society, 2014a, 59). Focus-group research into 
attitudes towards PMQs - the most famous House of Commons speaking ritual – found 
people describing it as a pantomime, a pathetic spectacle, a playground scene and ‘theatre 
- as in farce’ (Hansard Society, 2014b, 5-6). Political Scientists are scarcely more 
encouraging. A recent comparative and quantitative study confirms the feeling of lay 
observers when it concludes that ‘Parliamentary speech rarely has persuasive effects on 
policymaking. MPs do not normally take the floor with the intention of actually 
convincing their colleagues of the virtue of their position…’ (Proksch and Slapin, 2015, 
174). Given this it seems fair to ask what, if anything, is the point of Parliamentary 
debate?  
 
This is a question asked (sometimes indirectly) in a number of different disciplines and 
subfields and receiving a variety of different answers. In political science Proksch and 
Slapin (2015) have identified the benefits politicians hope to gain for themselves via 
Parliamentary speaking, and McLean (2001) has shown how it enables successful 
‘heresthetical’ maneuvers. Interpretive approaches have explored how the symbolic and 
ceremonial aspects of debate serve to reproduce hierarchical norms of Parliamentary 
culture (Lovenduski, 2012; Rai, 2010; et. al.) and ideological discourses (e.g. Jarvis and 
Legrand, 2016). Beyond political science there is excellent work on the uses and effects 
of Parliamentary activities from fields such as Anthropology (Crewe, 2010; 2015), 
Linguistics (e.g. Ilie, 2001; Shaw, 2000) and Psychology (e.g. Bull and Wells, 2012).  
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To these I want to contribute further insights from the history and theory of rhetoric and 
from political theory, as it renews its interest in political institutions and practices such as 
Parliamentary debate. As Waldron argues, political theorists should inquire into ‘the way 
our political institutions house and frame our disagreements about social ideals and 
orchestrate what is done about whatever aims we can settle on’ (2013, 8-9). Excellent 
work in this vein includes Weale et. al. (2012) which cleverly combined empirical 
analysis of Commons debate with its evaluation against norms of deliberative reciprocity 
(see also Steiner et. al. 2005). In the present article, however, my aim is not to evaluate 
Commons debate against some fundamental principle. Instead I take it that part of ‘the 
housing’ of our political institutions is how we conceive of them – the historical 
institutions of thought about rhetoric and argument. These form the unfinished (and 
sometimes unsettled) foundation of our political practices, being simultaneously source 
and object of dispute.   
 
In this article, then, I seek to remind us of the complexity and contingency of these 
foundations by looking at some of the history of ideas about Parliamentary debate and 
rhetoric through the lens of four core concepts: deliberation, oratory, opposition and 
spectacle. These are not the names of singular ideas let alone schools of thought; they are 
conceptual fields each of which gives a particular shape to ways of conceiving, criticizing 
and defending Commons debate. I look at each in turn, discussing historical debates and 
practices alongside contemporary arguments found in political theory, political science 
and in the study of rhetoric. In mapping this topos I show that our thinking and arguing 
about the Commons is part of a contested and ongoing history more complex than we 
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usually acknowledge. It certainly exceeds the frame of ‘deliberation’. In the concluding 
section I reflect on how appreciating this might affect our thinking about, and research 
into,  Parliamentary debate and its reform. Thus the article is intended as a contribution to 
political theories of rhetoric and democracy but also, and perhaps above all, to 
Parliamentary Studies.  
 
Deliberation 
 
The primary way in which we conceive of, analyse and evaluate Commons debate is in 
relation to ideas of deliberation and rationality. The founding exemplar of this way of 
thinking is of course Jeremy Bentham. Political Tactics (written in 1791 but published in 
1843) was not hugely influential in Great Britain. It was more important in France, Spain, 
Argentina and elsewhere (James et. al. 1999, xxxv-xxxviii). But its ideas were known to 
the Mills and other nineteenth-century reformers and it exemplifies key aspects of the 
deliberative conception of Parliaments. In the book Bentham presented his design of a 
Parliamentary building and a procedure which would make it possible to ‘obtain in its 
most genuine purity the real and enlightened will of the assembly’ (1999: 70). He 
proceeded negatively, justifying each of his rules as ‘the prevention of an evil’ and the 
removal of an obstacle on the path to a clearly expressed will (1999: 17). For example, 
Bentham worried that if in the chamber ‘any of the seats are so distant that the voice with 
difficulty reaches them, attention being rendered painful, will not be long sustained’, 
delegates, unable to concentrate on what is being said, may be ‘obliged to decide upon a 
borrowed opinion’ (1999: 45) and the primary quality required of participants be not 
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‘mental superiority’ but physical advantage in the form of sufficient lung capacity to 
speak across the hall.  
 
With such challenges in mind Bentham proposed that the debating chamber be a circular 
amphitheatre at the centre of which would be an elaborate mechanism for display of the 
motions to be decided: a gallery above the chair of the presiding officer, composed of 
frames of nine feet by six and visible from everywhere. It would prevent ‘irregular 
movements, reciprocal interruptions, confusion and noise’ and enable the smooth 
delivery of arguments since nobody would have to remember the motion: ‘There ought 
not to be a necessity of seeking for words when there is already too much to do in seeking 
for argument’, he wrote, and ‘the hesitation occasioned by such a search disturbs the 
current of the thoughts’ (1999: 46). The ‘table of motions’ would ‘contribute to the 
perfection of the debate’ protecting against errors, ‘insidious representations’ and 
digressions which arise from ‘weakness of the mind’ (1999: 47). Bentham is alert to the 
material and physical aspects of Parliamentary debate but what underlies his concerns 
with design is characteristic of more disembodied theories of deliberation: a desire to 
unify the elements of the debate process, bringing reading, thinking, speaking and 
listening into an alignment such that, from their interaction, the rational and common 
might crystallize and be incontrovertibly apparent to all.  
 
This way of thinking is also evident in Bentham’s Handbook of Political Fallacies 
written as a response to W.G. Hamilton’s Handbook of Parliamentary Logick. Hamilton 
served in the Commons from 1754 to 1796. Famous for delivering a lauded oration at the 
start of his career but never speaking again ‘single speech Hamilton’ (as he was known) 
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attended closely to the speeches of others and compiled a handbook to aid the would-be 
Parliamentarian (published posthumously in 1808). It consists of a series of maxims and 
aphorisms, some of which are versions of themes from classical rhetoric while others are 
of his own invention or specification. He advises one to consider ‘what ought to be 
proved, and how probably it will be evaded…you know the consequences you want; find 
out a principle to justify them’ and then presents techniques with which to do so. As 
Palonen observes, with advice such as ‘When an argument is brought to prove one thing, 
shew that it likewise prove another’ (1808: 2) and to debate by running a ‘vice into a 
virtue, and vice versa’ Hamilton indicates how deeply was the eighteenth-century 
Parliament embedded in a Renaissance rhetorical culture of argumentation rather 
different from that idealized by Philosophical radicals or by contemporary post-Kantian 
theorists of the public sphere and ideal speech situation.  
 
Bentham did not approve: ‘What Machiavelli has sometimes been supposed to have 
aimed at’ he wrote, Hamilton ‘not only aims at, but aims at it without disguise’ (1952: 
12). He condemned Hamilton for treating Parliament as ‘a sort of gaming-house’ in 
which ‘disingenuousness, lying, hypocrisy, fallacy - all are the instruments employed by 
the players on both sides for obtaining advantages in the game’ (1952, 13). He hoped that 
his Handbook would aid in the elimination of rhetorical actions such as appeals to 
‘ancient’ authority and the ‘hobgoblin argument’ (better known today as ‘project fear’). 
These, Bentham wrote, should be met ‘not with a cry of “Order! Order!" but with voices 
in scores crying aloud “Stale! Stale! Fallacy of Authority! Fallacy of Distrust”’ (1952, 
259). 
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Bentham’s ideal Assembly was built on the rejection of Renaissance practices of 
disputation (to which we shall return shortly). He wanted to perfect a circuit of 
communication by cleansing debate of the sorts of language and argument that might 
disrupt the manifestation of the will of the assembly. Underlying this is the conviction 
that the rational common will already exists and is waiting to be distilled from 
deliberations which are revelatory rather than constitutive. Failure triggers a search for 
the element which hinders the process so that it may be subtracted and the equation 
resolved.  
 
Such thinking has shaped many arguments about how Commons debate should work – 
past and present, favourable and critical. For example, Schmitt, in his diagnosis of the 
‘crisis’ of Parliamentary Democracy (1923) who describes Bentham as a ‘fanatic of 
Liberal rationality’ embraces the utilitarian’s conception of Parliamentary deliberation so 
as to claim that it is now hopelessly redundant. According to Schmitt the ‘intellectual 
foundation’ of Parliaments lies not in their representative nature but their commitment to 
‘a process of confrontation of differences and opinions’ out of which a political will is 
established. He defines Parliamentary debate as ‘an exchange of opinion that is governed 
by the purpose of persuading one’s opponent through argument of the truth or justice of 
something, or allowing oneself to be persuaded of something as true and just’ (1923, 5). 
Laws, then, are made on the basis of a clash of opinions rather than of interests, and 
debate requires ‘independence from party ties and freedom from selfish interests’: ‘public 
debate and public discussion, parley’ writes Schmitt takes place ‘without taking 
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democracy into account’. But in mass democracy parties represent economic and social 
interests, winning assent for their authority through propaganda and appeals to the 
passions. Parliament thus no longer has an intellectual foundation or meaning. Popular 
representation has upset the balance of power and debates are now a ‘façade’ (1923, 49) 
hiding the fact that ‘all public business has become an object of spoils and compromise’ 
(1923, 4). In a striking image Schmitt describes the norms and rules of Parliament as ‘like 
a superfluous decoration, useless and even embarrassing as though someone had painted 
the radiator of a modern central heating system with red flames in order to give the 
appearance of a blazing fire’ (1923, 6).  
 
What interests me here is that Schmitt cleaves to the Benthamite formulation even as he 
opposes Parliament. He wants to show that deliberation is corrupted by the intrusion of 
parties and sectional interests so that we will agree on the need to remove them in order 
for the national will to be made manifest. It’s a line of thought that would ultimately lead 
Schmitt to advocate fuherprinzip. The step from wanting to purify deliberation through 
subtraction to subtracting deliberation altogether is not a hard one to take. And something 
like the Schmittian charge that Parliament has been corrupted by parties, elections or 
sectional interests is a commonplace across ideological lines. It is there in Miliband’s 
criticisms in The State in Capitalist Society and in Lord Hailsham’s famous lecture on 
‘elective dictatorship’ which argued that ‘Until recently, debate and argument dominated 
the Parliamentary scene. Now it is the whips and the party caucus. More and more, 
debate, where is not actually curtailed, is becoming a ritual dance, sometimes 
interspersed with catcalls’ (Hailsham, 1976). Of course, the point here is not to suggest 
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that Miliband or Hailsham are Schmittians. Rather, it is that a concept of deliberation 
shapes celebratory conceptions of Parliamentary debate and critical accounts of its 
decline. It inspires reformers to look for sources of corruption, obstacles or absences 
which prevent the emergence of a settled will. That may lead to efforts to purify the 
deliberative process by ensuring that Members act as unsullied representatives. 
Alternatively, it may lead to demands for a more ‘descriptive representation’ such that the 
debaters more precisely mirror those on whose behalf they debate. In both cases the 
‘problematic’ - the ‘matrix or the angle from which it will become possible and even 
necessary to formulate a certain number of precise problems’ (Maniglier, 2012, 173) - is 
the same: how to assemble and arrange the elements of the deliberative process such that 
the true will is revealed.  
 
In Political Tactics Bentham recommended that members wear a distinctive form of dress 
so that there should never be any uncertainty as to who was who, and who was authorized 
to be where they were (1999: 51-2). It is a rule indicative of the approach: good 
deliberation requires the institution of boundaries between inside and outside which 
prevent contamination and corruption. Schmitt was opposed to the inclusion within 
debate of the interests of the people outside; left-wing critics are hostile to the presence 
inside the chamber of private and powerful class interests; radical democratic critics want 
more of the outside to be on the inside. Within this problematic the deliberative 
conception can seem like it encompasses the entire universe of debate about 
Parliamentary debate. It does not.  
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Oratory  
 
Deliberation is the most common and the dominant framework for assessments and 
interpretations of Commons debate. But it is only one such framework. Historically, 
almost as common have been those which focus on oratory. However, as democracy 
extended and deepened, and as the boundary between the inside and outside of 
Parliament became blurred and contested, there was increased critical discussion of the 
extent to which such ‘dignified’ speech compromised the demands of ‘efficiency’ – a 
discussion countered by claims about the intrinsic qualities of great oratory. 
 
In the nineteenth-century encomia on the fine art of Parliamentary debate were both 
invocations of a lost Golden Age and ideological celebrations of a ‘unique’ English 
liberty (Palonen, 2016). Erskine May, closing the first volume of his Constitutional 
History of England with a review of Parliamentary oratory, called it ‘an honour and 
ornament to our history’ and ‘one of the proud results of our free constitution’ (1861, 
480). His assessments focused on the beauty, skill and genius of individual 
Parliamentarians, the passion or authority of their delivery, the vividness of their 
language and their wit. But May realised that styles were changing to suit the needs of a 
new kind of government. Excellence in debate had suffered from the ‘multiplied demands 
of public affairs’ (1861, 495) and Parliamentarians addressed themselves ‘more to reason 
and less to the imagination, the feeling and the passions of their audience’. Further, ‘They 
confront not only the members of their own body but the whole people – who are rather 
to be convinced by argument than persuaded by the fascination of the orator’ (1861, 490). 
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Here, in contrast to the Benthamite, deliberative perspective, publicity is thought to 
contribute to a decline in Parliamentary oratory by making it more reasonable and this is 
accounted a loss. 
 
Decline is a commonplace of writing about Parliamentary Oratory. Before May we find 
it, for example, in De Quincey for whom the prevalence of bills on matters such as roads, 
energy companies and the exchequer rendered ‘the face of public business vulgarized by 
details’ (1893[1828], 154) and before that in Hume, writing in 1742, for whom eloquence 
had sadly declined far below classical precedent. Throughout the nineteenth and into the 
twentieth-century reflections on Parliamentary eloquence hark back to past glories while 
emphasizing that their time has passed. Lord Curzon, in his reflections on Modern 
Parliamentary Eloquence delivered at Oxford in 1913, lamented that oratory was no 
longer recognised as an art (1913: 4). There were, he suggested, still those in whom ‘the 
silver of ordinary speech is turned into gold on his lips’ and whose speech ‘strikes a 
chord in our heart which thrills as though it has been touched by celestial fingers’ - but 
these were the minority. Decline, he thought, had a number of causes not least that a 
Parliament composed of members who had neither read Demosthenes nor translated 
Cicero, learning instead from the debating society and platform, was no longer a place for 
the leisurely exchange of quotation and allusion (1913: 11); members were uninterested 
in ‘imagery, metaphor, antithesis, alliteration, trope’. But the root of the change was that 
Parliament had of necessity become ‘a gigantic workshop’ (1913: 13) preoccupied with 
an increased volume of legislation making members ever busier in the libraries, reading 
rooms and lobbies rather than in the chamber. Outside the House, press reporting and the 
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rise of the platform had drained the energy from Commons debate and injected it with the 
anxiety of publicity. The rise of the whips, the ‘tyranny of the party machine’ had 
destroyed the independence of mind necessary for great oratory giving rise to speeches of 
a standard, conventional and commonplace kind.  
 
This aesthetic conception of Commons debate – the view that it should be beautiful, 
powerful and moving and that the opposite is evidence of decline - is part of a history of 
thinking for which eloquence is both a cause and an index of virtue. It is a classical idea, 
reinvigorated - with ambivalence - in eighteenth-century Britain (Potkay, 1994). In the 
nineteenth-century it was identified with an aristocratic conception of politics and, by 
supporters and opponents alike, opposed to egalitarian and thus demotic ideas of politics. 
Debate about debate, about what politics should sound like, was a vehicle for arguments 
about what politics should be like, the functions of Parliament, and the risks and benefits 
of substituting a chamber of gentlemen thinking for one of bureaucrats doing.  
 
In his study of nineteenth-century writings on Parliaments Palonen (2016) shows 
practitioners and observers working themselves out from under classical oratorical 
precedent, recognizing and refining a specifically Parliamentary form of disputation 
requiring skills quite different from those needed for the beautiful oration: shorter 
speeches, a Parliamentary persona, skill in silencing opponents. In the twentieth-century 
this developed into claims about the redundancy of Parliamentary debate. Balfour, in a 
1924 speech, could ‘not imagine anything less suited to the efficient administration of 
public affairs than a House of Commons…entirely composed of ingenious and eloquent 
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orators’ (quoted in Palonen,  2016, 127). On the other side of the political spectrum not 
all would go quite as far as G.D.H. Cole but he was far from alone in feeling – in the 
context of economic and political crisis - that no socialist government should lose 
hundreds of its members ‘to sit day after day in Parliament listening to one another talk’ 
when they might be doing ‘pioneering’ work. Parliament, he suggested, should meet 
‘only so often as needed for some clearly practical purposes’ adding that ‘there will be no 
time for superfluous debating while we are busy building the Socialist commonwealth’ 
(1933, 73). For both Balfour and Cole Commons debate is conceived of as distracting 
from complex legislative issues requiring specialist knowledge. Laski, in 1944, noted 
how the substance of debates had shifted from matters of quality to quantity, from great 
and general issues such as Ireland, toleration and the franchise to ‘the future of export 
trade, the ownership and control of the mining industry, and the amount of the allowance 
for the dependents of men and women in the forces’. Under such conditions, he 
continued, ‘…the type of oration which, as with Mr. Burke, was a spoken book, or with 
Mr. Gladstone, was like a Bach cantata, is utterly unsuited to the medium involved’ 
(1944, 350).  
 
The evaluation of styles of Parliamentary oratory changes as part of a broader change in 
the theory and practice of government, one which is in part legitimated by the distinction 
between an aristocratic and aesthetic form of speech and another which is technical, 
practical and businesslike; between what Oakeshott would, in 1959, see as the language 
suited to a free society of ‘conversationalists’ and that of practical activity made from 
words with agreed symbolism and learned through imitation (Oakeshott, 1962). Bernard 
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Crick, in a Fabian Pamphlet published in the same year thought the strong executive 
demanded publicity and criticism (1959: 2) but that these could be engendered through 
professionalization: increased office support for MPs, better research facilities, the 
refinement of specialist scrutinizing committees. Informed and well-disseminated 
criticism could be encouraged and facilitated but not primarily in the debating chamber 
itself. Many shared the view of the political scientist A.H. Hanson who in 1964 wrote of 
the ‘manifest incapacity of a body of 630 amateurs, employing a procedure devised in 
other days for other purposes, to supervise an administrative machine now become so 
ubiquitous and complex that it penetrates every corner of the national life’ (1964: 285). 
Rather than ‘an arena in which the rival parties fight their wordy battles’ Parliament 
should be an advisory body, working through committees. In the managerial society of 
Schumpeterian democracy procedure needed to be rationalized and futile, time-
consuming debates curtailed.  
 
This sort of thinking has guided some significant reforms of Parliament. But it is a 
paradox too little attended to that reform of a speaking place should aim to define ‘good’ 
speaking out of existence, and it is a concern that proposals to free the House from 
speech rules and rituals unintelligible to the public (e.g. Digital Democracy Commission, 
2014) neglect to consider the extent to which a decision to change the language the 
House uses to do politics is also a change to the politics it does. Debate about what makes 
great speech great is itself a dimension of political debate and one thing Parliament and 
Rhetoric scholars might do is recover and reinvigorate a lost vocabulary for oratorical 
criticism. That would enable and enrich reflection on when it is best to speak in a simple 
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and plain, bureaucratic and workmanlike style and when a grander, ornate or more 
passionate discourse is required. After all, Parliamentarians do keep speaking, the 
debating chamber is what most people think of when they think of the House, and 
assessment as well as celebration of the capacity of individual speakers to produce fine 
and moving words remains a mainstay of both journalistic commentary and political 
memoir. Sketch writers may not often use the terms of classical rhetoric but they will 
refer to speakers’ qualities of voice, bearing, forensic skill and wit and occasionally a 
great speech or speaker grabs the attention. At the time of writing the 2015 maiden 
speech of Mhairi Black (the member for Paisley and Renfrewshire) has received over 
700000 views on You Tube suggesting at least some degree of public interest in a 
powerful and characterful speech delivered in the Chamber. ‘As far as most normal 
citizens are concerned’, said Speaker Bercow in a 2010 speech, ‘the Chamber is 
Parliament at work and if there are not very many people there then Parliament cannot be 
working that hard’. It was, he said, a simplistic critique but ‘not a stupid one’ (Bercow, 
2010). Indeed.  
 
Rhetoric scholars do not see Parliamentary speech as mere speech; it is the wrought 
representation of thought as it appears in the political arena. Such a view can be 
congruent with versions of deliberation in as much as it leads to a Burkean ideal of 
delegates free from the direct constraints of constituents and so able to develop thinking 
and speaking which resonates or is in harmony with the principles embedded in evolving 
political institutions. From this perspective Parliamentary debate necessarily declines if 
fine speech is displaced by commitment to the bureaucratic forensic of Committees 
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where virtue resides in procedural propriety. But fine speech may also be conceived of as 
that which most effectively expresses, perhaps against the wishes of the Executive, the 
discontents of those outside the House. To this we now turn.  
 
Opposition 
 
Deliberative approaches are often hostile to the most obvious and distinctive feature of 
the Westminster chamber: it’s antagonistic design. As we have seen, Bentham’s charge 
against Hamilton was that he was cynical, self-interested, Machiavellian. Hamilton urges 
a speaker to ‘State the question to be proved and the arguments made use of to prove it. 
By colouring one, and softening the other, you will gain an advantage’ (1808, 5). Reading 
this it is hard not to think of him as perpetuating what is often denounced as the 
Commons ‘Punch and Judy show’. But, as we have already noted, Hamilton’s thinking 
has its roots in a Renaissance conception of disputation which forms an important part of 
our historic tradition of thinking about Parliamentary debate.  
 
Opposition is well understood to be fundamental to the British House of Commons. It is 
enshrined in the topography of the House, in the institutional support given to the shadow 
front bench and in the rules and practices of debate. Political theorists tend to think of this 
in relation to principles such as the separation of powers, checks and balances, the 
alternation of office holders and so on (Fontana, 2009). In the standard story the origins 
of the Opposition are found in the early eighteenth-century, concomitant with the rise of 
Prime Ministerial authority and the development of clear divisions in the House. It 
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consists of recognition of a right to oppose and criticize the government (in speech) and 
to seek to replace it (Johnson, 1997).  
 
The term ‘Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition’ dates from 1825 but its ‘constitutional’ status 
was not formally recognized until the granting of a salary in 1937 and of Short money in 
1975. Such recognition was described in 1924 – by Harvard President Lawrence Lowell – 
as ‘the greatest contribution of the nineteenth-century to the art of government’ (quoted 
in Fontana, 2009, 550). In 1961 Ivor Jennings – Vice-Chancellor of the University of 
Cambridge - saw it as an expression of the historical achievement of freeing Parliament 
from the monarchy. ‘To find out whether a people is politically free’ he wrote ‘it is 
necessary only to ask if there is an Opposition and, if there is, to ask where it is’ (1961, 
86). In this and similar readings the most important feature of Opposition is the 
institutionalization of alternative government (Johnson, 1997; Shapiro, 1999; Waldron, 
2016; Webber, 2016). But such institutionalisation is also a source of criticism in the 
form of anxiety that it entails co-option and the growth of ‘cartel parties’ (Katz and Mair, 
1995). After all, the Opposition has no real veto power (Helms, 2004), governments have 
all the advantages and, as Anthony King put it, ‘most of the time Oppositions can draw 
on only two resources in their relations with Governments: good reasons, and time’ 
(1976: 18). Here we get to the heart of the matter. Opposition fundamentally involves the 
presentation, in debate, of ‘good reasons’ to reject the government position; it is a 
rhetorical activity. 
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That activity predates the start of the standard story of opposition. Long before the 
eighteenth-century the House had arranged itself in divisions and adopted turn-taking in 
debates. In the Elizabethan Parliament ordinary members could oppose councilors, and 
sometimes see their views prevail, (Mack, 2002, 240) taking part in a form of debate 
shaped by a grammar school curriculum which included Humanist training in rhetorical 
disputation (Mack, 2002, Chapter 1). They believed the powers of speech extensive and 
profound and, as students of Cicero, thought their use central to political practice not only 
in the form of grand orations but also as adversarial debate (Peltonen, 2012). Indeed, such 
was a central duty of citizenship (2012, 131-2). Accordingly, speaking to a controversy 
and on both sides of the question - in utramque partem - was, by 1539 established 
(Peltonen, 2012, 139). School pupils learned how to structure speeches, employ 
commonplaces and how to refute adversaries (2012, 85) and in the House, writes Mack, 
‘The form of debate and the shared experience of disputation, together with the 
possibility that disagreement would be resolved by majority vote, produced some 
obligation on government speakers to answer arguments, to give reasons, and to respond 
to messages’. The Queens’ councillors in the House, he says, ‘evidently found it an 
ordeal to be called even to this weak form of account’ (see also Hockin, 1971, 51-6).  
 
Such a classically inspired ideal of disputatious rhetoric on both sides of a question, 
would be seen by both Hobbes and Locke as a source of disorder and faction. But it 
remained influential. For Hume, eloquence mattered because it was an essential feature of 
popular government and, crucially, a means of Opposition to the corruptions of the 
Walpole ministry (Potkay, 1994, 40-44). Appreciation of the necessity of rhetorical 
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antagonism was a structuring element of later thinking focused on both deliberation and 
oratory including some, such as Mill, in the Benthamite tradition (see Lopez, 2014). The 
oppositional principle of debate can, indeed, be congruent with that of balanced 
deliberation but in its implicit perspectivism, and openness to the effects of persuasion it 
is some distance from the Rousseauian ideal of a silent assembly of individuals listening 
to what the heart tells them and waiting for the Will to reveal itself. As Palonen observes 
the institutionalization of Opposition in Parliamentary debate is rooted in recognition of a 
claim made by Socrates’ ancient interlocutor Protagoras: for every question there are 
always at least two opposing arguments which may answer it. Dissensus, then, is the 
raison d’etre of Parliaments and Hamilton’s maxims are tools ‘for increasing the chances 
to oppose the proposition at hand, not to accept any governmental proposal at face value’ 
(Palonen, 2008b, 89). From this perspective Oppositional speaking is about more than 
free speech and alternative government. It enables, engenders (even induces) the 
presentation of views in opposition to established authority or consensus. Where some 
propose that the outcome of free discussion, given enough time, will be a better 
approximation of the truth Palonen wryly remarks that ‘we could rather claim that the 
longer we debate, the more time we will have to construct different and opposite points of 
view’ (2008a: 143). Members politick over agendas, debate times and closure (Palonen, 
2008: 17) using rules and arguments to try and break open fixed majorities, reordering 
voting preferences so that losers might become winners (see Shepsle, 2003).  
 
The oppositional principle can be seen as a Madisonian bulwark against elective 
dictatorship, the ambition of the opposition countering the ambition of government. In 
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contrast to those hoping that deliberation might make a common will or common good 
visible the oppositional perspective sees in Parliament a place not only for the completion 
of formal business but also for the public articulation of opposition, and things going 
wrong when opposition is lacking, insufficient or incompetent. This is an agonistic 
conception of Parliamentary debate as something which, far from establishing the 
sovereignty of the popular, national or rational will proves its plurality and its potential 
for transformation.  
 
Today, some observers - worried that too much opposition disrupts deliberation or sets a 
bad example to the watching public - advocate the replacement of the Commons chamber 
with a horseshoe-shaped simulacrum of consensus. But for agonists the question is how 
to give counter-publics expression within as well as against the chamber. Stuart 
Hampshire celebrated a politics which included the public staging of the contest between 
rival and contradictory elements of the ‘soul’ of a polity (Hampshire, 1999: 39).  
Contemporary studies show that MPs participate in debates primarily in order to ‘signal’ 
positions to the electorate (Proksch and Slapin, 2015). That makes it seem merely rational 
self-interest. But it is also a way of doing public politics. For Jennings the Opposition 
was the ‘spearhead’ of an attack on government, one which reflected public opinion, 
bringing to the House and expressing in public ‘the questions raised in the factory, the 
railway carriage and the office’ (1961: 87). Earlier, in 1935, he had pointed out that 
‘Opposition members debate the government’s measures and go into the division lobbies 
against them not because they expect to be successful but because they consider that a 
formal protest is necessary’ (1935, 211). Their audience is the public outside of the 
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House and ‘debate is propaganda…an appeal to the reason or to the prejudices of sections 
of the electorate to vote against the government candidates at the next election’ (1935, 
212). It was also a focus for activities taking place outside of Parliament, in the media, at 
public meetings and demonstrations (1935, 218). As Hockin concluded in 1971 ‘the 
spectacle of Opposition political parties not only talking to Parliament, but campaigning, 
propagandizing and demonstrating outside of Parliament is all part of the style of modern 
public party Opposition’. It is to such spectacle we must now turn.  
 
Spectacle 
 
Nineteenth-Century observers of Parliament understood something of its spectacular 
function. Bagehot (1867) famously described the Commons as ‘the great scene of debate, 
the great engine of popular instruction and political controversy’ and he did so against the 
backdrop of an explosion of political discourse including the platform, debating societies 
and local Parliament Clubs thirty-five thousand of which were active in 1883 (Meisel, 
2001). As a Times reporter put it in 1873, ‘In the course of these fifty years we have 
become a nation of public speakers. Everyone speaks now, and tolerable well too…We 
are now more than ever a debating, that is, a Parliamentary people’ (quoted in Bevis,  
2003, p. 1). In this context Bagehot saw in Parliamentary debate the fulfillment of a 
crucial educative function. ‘To teach the nation what it does not know’ was, he said, a 
more important function of Parliament than legislating. Its debates instructed by 
marshalling and re-presenting facts and argument but also by being exemplars. Similarly, 
Earl Grey conceived of Parliamentary debate as ‘contributing much to the instruction of 
22 
the nation at large on all subjects deeply concerning its interests’ and as ‘an instrument 
for forming and guiding public opinion’ (1864, 36-7). Here, then, Parliament is but one 
component of a much larger national political debate if, for Bagehot, the most important. 
The apex of political discussion and its most ideal form, its speeches should be a means 
for ‘arousing, enlivening and teaching a people’ with both an ‘expressive function’ to 
‘express the mind of the English people’ (1873, 119) and a ‘lyrical function’: ‘it pours out 
in characteristic words the characteristic heart of the nation. And it can do little more 
useful’ (1873, 140) 
 
Few today are likely to claim that Commons debate really leads the ‘national 
conversation’ or exemplifies enlightened and proper political conduct. Yet it is a focus of 
political reporting and something like Bagehot’s conception is implicit in critiques of the 
unbecoming conduct of members, demands for Parliament to be recalled in order to 
address emergency matters, and insistence that major announcements be made first 
before the House rather than the press. Such calls recognise that the Commons 
contributes to the ‘housing’ of our disputes not only through representing the people 
outside on the inside but also through the way in which the inside is represented outside. 
The right to make and consume such representations has been a significant dimension of 
political struggle and laws such as those preventing the use of footage of Parliament ‘in 
any light entertainment programme or in a programme of political satire’ are not only 
struggles over liberty of expression but also over understandings of the relationship 
between Commons debate and national debate as a whole. In Britain the Parliament is, to 
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adapt a phrase Frank Ankersmit used to describe political parties, ‘one of the 
indispensable political dramatis personae’ (1997, 63).  
 
Some deliberative approaches in the British tradition are in favour of publicity, as a check 
on members, a way of communicating information between governors and governed, as a 
source of legitimacy (Bentham, 1999, 29-44). Here the matter of publicity is the facts of 
proceedings, the votes cast, the arguments made. But discourses of Parliamentary 
‘spectacle’ concern more than this and recent political theory helps to see why they are 
right to. The deliberativist thinks in terms of ‘voice’ and sees publicity as a way of 
opening Parliament to the public voice and including it in the legislative processes. To 
this focus on the power of voice Jeffrey Green proposes we add a concept of ‘ocular’ 
power, of the capacity of publics to see what leaders are doing and to exercise the 
judgemental power of the gaze. For Green, democratic citizens exercise judgement over 
laws but also over leaders and this requires commitment to ‘candour’, an ‘institutional 
requirement that leaders not be in control of the conditions of their publicity’. They must, 
he writes, make public appearances which are ‘neither rehearsed, preplanned nor 
managed from above but rather contain all the risk and uncertainty of spontaneous public 
events’ (Green, 2010, 14). Here Green distinguishes between the disfiguring effects of 
‘pseudo-events’ (stage-managed walkabouts, over-managed conferences) and ‘eventful 
events’ in which ‘we do not observe merely what we already know or what someone else 
wants us to know, but rather something that is revealed in the course of the happening 
itself’ (2010, 20). At such events the inequality of ruler and ruled is challenged by a 
‘negative’ egalitarianism bringing leaders down to our level. It is worth noting in this 
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context that US Presidents are obliged to deliver inaugural and state of the union 
addresses; party leaders must deliver a speech to their party conference; Prime Ministers 
Questions is compulsory in practice if not in statute (see Finlayson and Martin 2008; 
Atkins et. al., 2014). All are chances for spectators to exercise their power of judgement 
over leaders brought down to eye-level.  
 
 
Spectacle is not only a means of education through exemplarity of the sort Bagehot 
described. It is also about the creation of collective experiences constitutive of 
democratic political identities. As John Parkinson argues ‘democracy is not merely the 
interplay of arguments and reasons in some abstract public sphere but is performed by 
people, with aims, on stages’ (2012, 23) of which there are many (meeting halls, 
committee rooms, town squares, demonstrations, occupations, TV studios). These stages 
have always pressed in on the Commons challenging its priority. A question for theory 
and analysis is how the Commons contributes or responds to arguments, claims and 
narratives circulating in and around various public spheres. That includes, in a phrase of 
Laski’s, how well it connects with the ‘ventilation of grievances’ (1938, 437-8), the 
extent to which the aggrieved or opposed outside see themselves represented inside. At a 
broader level it concerns the ‘representative claims’ to ‘represent or to know what 
represents the interests of someone or something’ (Saward, 2010, 38) that are made, 
through Commons performances, by individual MPs and by the House as a whole. Here, 
then, the problematic shaping thinking about Parliamentary debate is not that of who or 
what to include or exclude from deliberation but that of how the spectacle is to be 
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produced, the capacity of members to represent the outside on the inside and of publics to 
see them doing so and to judge them.  
 
Recent cultural sociologies of politics lend credence to this view. These show the extent 
to which the public sphere is not only a forum for rational debate but also a stage on 
which political and other actors perform their reasoning in ‘dramas tailored to audiences 
whose voices have become more legitimate references in political conflicts’ (Alexander, 
2006, 51). In Durkheimian parlance politicians embody ‘collective representations’, 
expressing values, beliefs and the ‘moods and meanings of the nation’s democratic life’ 
(Alexander, 2010, 18). Such performance are not necessarily corrupting of politics, and 
spectators are not necessarily passive. A spectator, as Ranciere argues, ‘observes, selects, 
compares, interprets’ linking what they see with things seen elsewhere and judging the 
whole (2009, 13). And when a performance involves argument in utramque partem 
audiences may compare the rival versions, seeing common norms and cultural-political 
assumptions played out before them. Such rhetorical spectacles are opportunities for 
different groups to see their ‘common sense’ invoked or represented and to exercise a 
power of judgment over the performers and thus also over themselves and that common 
opinion (Farrell 1993: 76). To adapt Bagehot, Parliament might be thought of as a stage 
on which performers, rather than teach the people what they do not know demonstrate the 
implications of what they believe. 
 
Conclusion: So, what is the point?   
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In this article I have sought to show something of the length and breadth of our tradition 
of thinking about Parliamentary debate, and of the place within it of some positions in 
more recent political science and political theory. Our thinking about what Parliamentary 
debate is for is part of a long and messy history made from commonplaces about the 
virtues and vices of oratory, the shifting ideological and cultural meanings of eloquence, 
the unstable relationship between efficiency and debate, the value and cost of opposition 
and the changing role and place of publics in politics. 
 
More specifically, we have seen how reflections on Parliament, both celebratory and 
critical, play out differently if the central concept is that of deliberation or oratory, 
opposition or spectacle. Identifying, clarifying and elaborating the workings of these 
concepts is, I believe, useful because it enhances our self-knowledge. As Pocock once 
remarked, ‘Each of us speaks with many voices, like a tribal shaman in whom the 
ancestor ghosts are all talking at once’ (1973, 31). Historically minded political theory 
can help us to become more conscious of the pre-existing conceptual, descriptive and 
analytic vocabularies we draw on when arguing about something such as Parliament, and 
also of the power they exercise over us. But in the case of Parliament, the presence of 
varied voices making claims about what debate is for is of more than antiquarian or 
existential interest and should not wish to reduce the cacophony to a simple harmony. 
After all, it tells us something important about political debate and points to something 
essential to Parliament itself. When we seek to solve a political dispute through parley we 
affirm that parley is a good way to proceed and at the same time demonstrate a way in 
which it might take place. In the House of Commons where there are procedural rules 
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based on custom and precedent, open to interpretation and sometimes broken, the 
practices of debaters, not to mention the expectations and responses of their auditors, are 
also interpretations and reinterpretations of the rules. Parliamentary debate is always 
debate about debate - who can take part, how they must conduct themselves, the terms of 
discussion, what it is for, what can and can’t be said. Parliamentary debate doesn’t take 
place despite divisions over style and substance, dignity and efficiency, reason and 
passion, speech and action, inside and outside – it takes place because of them and within 
them.  
 
With this in mind, when seeking to understand and evaluate Parliamentary debate, and in 
reflecting on its reform, we must break free from the tyranny of ‘deliberation’. It is of 
course a central aspect of Parliaments, and rightly so. I am not opposed to deliberation. 
But exclusive emphasis upon it, and the effort to perfect the deliberative dimensions of 
Commons practice, obscures from view the range of things that debate is for and that it 
can do, the rich histories that have shaped our practices of it, and the contestation which 
is central to it. As Jeremy Waldron argues political theorists’ study of institutions should 
involve not only normative judgments but also thinking about ‘the importance of history, 
of political aesthetics and the symbolic, ceremonial, maybe even the sacramental, aspects 
of the processes we use for assembling and deliberating about the common good’ (2013, 
14). These aspects are becoming ever more prominent – sometimes because of their 
absence - yet the way we often think about our Parliamentary practices inclines us to 
resist them and to search instead for ways to remove the obstacles to perceived 
deficiencies of deliberative quality. We should at least consider the possibility that noisy 
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opposition and dramatic spectacle are not symptomatic of decline in the quality of debate 
nor necessarily in contradiction with the ideal of Parliament as a centre of rational 
deliberation. They are ineradicable dimensions of Parliamentary practice, reassertions of 
suppressed aspects of our Parliamentary tradition, and vital to the connection of ‘we the 
people’ with Parliamentary politics.  
 
Attending to historical tradition does not mean that we need be timid or conservative in 
remedying present discontents. If we are mindful of the distinct ways in which we might 
think of the point of Parliamentary debate we can perhaps think more radically about 
varieties of reform. There must of course be clear deliberation and forensic scrutiny but, 
conscious of the ways in which the public disputation of issues has value even when not 
part of legislative actions we might also think about ways of staging different kinds of 
Parliamentary debate so as to ensure spontaneity and ‘candour’ while ‘ventilating’ 
grievance. There must be effective performances of opposition and instances of fine 
speech with the capacity to capture and to give public presence to a moment and a 
feeling. Here reformers might, for example, focus on the skill and capacity of 
Parliamentarians when it comes to speaking well (and on the ability of journalistic 
commentators to assess them according to standards internal to the practice of debate as 
well as according to personal whim or editorial demand). The challenge is to find new 
ways to stage confrontations of opinions and interests and to rearticulate the relationship 
between such performances and the multiplicity of audiences that might be included 
within them.  
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We noted at the start of this article that public rejection of Parliamentary debate 
sometimes turns on the view that it is ‘theatre – as in farce’. By widening and deepening 
our understanding and our use of the concepts which shape thinking about Parliament we 
might see that the Commons is held in disrepute not because it is too theatrical but 
because it is bad theatre: amateur dramatics, old plots and bowdlerized scripts 
indifferently performed by actors insufficiently concerned with, or aware of, who is 
watching them or of the place of their performance alongside those taking place outside 
its walls in Parliament Square and beyond. Remedying this situation is a matter of some 
urgency and one which will require attention to Parliamentary deliberation, Parliamentary 
oratory, Parliamentary opposition and Parliamentary spectacle.  
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